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RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE. 
Edited by The Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 124. Paper, $12.95. 
International law, like a character in an Ingmar Bergman film, is 
haunted by doubts about its own existence. This existential angst 
deepened in the United States during the 1980s, as President Reagan 
unabashedly pursued goals abroad through military force. The Presi-
dent sent Contras and ship mines to Nicaragua, ordered an invasion of 
the Caribbean island nation of Grenada in 1983, and directed the 1986 
bombing of Libyan cities. He did so despite the United Nations Char-
ter's explicit prohibition on "the threat or use of force" 1 except in case 
of "self-defence if an armed attack occurs."2 Popularly dubbed the 
Reagan Doctrine, this increased willingness to use force renewed what 
David Scheffer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 
the introduction to Right v. Might, calls "the great American debate 
- namely, how to promote democracy overseas, combat terrorism, 
and remain faithful to the rule of law" (p. 1 ). 
Right v. Might contains a scholarly microcosm of this unsettled 
debate. Between 1985 and 1988, the Council on Foreign Relations, a 
New York-based, nonpartisan organization, sponsored seven meetings 
of American international lawyers, political scientists, historians, state 
department officials, and journalists. The group also included Steven 
Schwebel, a judge on the International Court of Justice, and U.S. Sen-
ator Daniel P. Moynihan (p. 108-09). These participants discussed 
whether international law on the use of military force really exists, 
what its contours are, how just it is, and whether the United States 
should try to change it. On these difficult and politically charged 
questions, the Council's John Temple Swing tells us in a brief fore-
word to the book, little consensus arose "beyond general agreement on 
the proposition that 'the rule of law' does matter. The differences lie 
in how that 'rule' is defined" (p. xi). 
1. This prohibition is in Article 2(4), which states: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
2. The exception is contained in Article 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
1963 
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Rather than summarize the contentiousness, the Council instead 
published the views put forth by several of the meetings' most distin-
guished participants. First, Jeane Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's 
representative to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985, and Allan 
Gerson, who served her as U.N. counsel during those years, define and 
defend their concept of the Reagan Doctrine. 3 Second, Professor 
Louis Henkin of Columbia University counters with his own definition 
of the Reagan Doctrine and contests both its legality and its wisdom 
(pp. 37-69). Third, Stanley Hoffmann, a Harvard European studies 
professor, describes the doctrine's effect on important bilateral and ex-
tra-legal rules that restrain the superpowers' use of force (pp. 71-93). 
Finally, William D. Rogers, an undersecretary of state during the 
Ford Administration and now an international lawyer, suggests ways 
to deal with states' unwillingness to be constrained by legality when 
facing "crises that touch on their national interest and security."4 The 
result is an interplay of ideas that illuminates deep ambivalence re-
garding the legality, morality, and inevitability of American use of 
military force. 
In the first essay, "The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and In-
ternational Law," Kirkpatrick and Gerson define the Reagan Doctrine 
as a moral and quasi-legal justification for American assistance of for-
eign peoples' "self-defense" (p. 31). The United States, they argue, 
legally may offer military support to insurgencies that battle 
nondemocratic governments maintained by force or by foreign arms 
(p. 20). Such support, however, must be limited to "counterforce and 
counterintervention" (p. 31; emphasis added); that is, it is valid only 
where lack of reciprocal adherence to U.N. Charter Article 2(4) has 
rendered international law feckless. Thus when state A unlawfully in-
tervenes in state B, the doctrine asserts, the United States need not 
unilaterally comply with the law, but may intervene in state B also. 
The invasion of Grenada, therefore, Kirkpatrick and Gerson ar-
gue, had nothing to do with the doctrine, because it was justified di-
rectly by a treaty, an official invitation, and American self-defense -
the rescuing of American medical students. Instead, the doctrine jus-
tified military support for Contras in Nicaragua, Mujaheddin in Af-
ghanistan, and UNIT A forces in Angola. 5 
Kirkpatrick and Gerson list four justifications for such support. 
First, nondemocratic governments maintained by force or by foreign 
arms are not legitimate: "the Declaration of Independence ... insists 
3. Pp. 19-36. See also 1 J. KIRKPATRICK, LEGITIMACY AND FORCE: POLITICAL AND 
MORAL DIMENSIONS (1988) [hereinafter LEGmMACY AND FORCE]. 
4. P. 103. See pp. 95-107. 
5. See also J. KIRKPATRICK, The Reagan Doctrine Ill, in 1 LEGITIMACY AND FORCE, supra 
note 3, at 44-0 (1988). 
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that legitimate government depends on the consent of the govemed."6 
Second, support for foes of illegitimate governments is rooted in great 
Western political philosophy. Immanuel Kant encouraged "interven-
tion to bring down despotic governments,"7 Kirkpatrick and Gerson 
argue, and they quote John Stuart Mill's proclamation that 
"[i]ntervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always 
moral."8 Third, they find support in American history. "The Reagan 
Doctrine," they argue, "supports the traditional American doctrine 
that armed revolt is justified as a last resort where rights of citizens are 
systematically violated" (p. 20). It is simply a more refined successor 
to the communism-containment strategies of Presidents Truman and 
Kennedy, and to "America supportmg freedom" in the Vietnam War 
- a cause for which Americans need not apologize (p. 28). 
Fourth, and most important, Kirkpatrick and Gerson point to the 
"whole purpose" of the U.N. Charter (p. 25). It is not only to main-
tain peace, they write, but also to promote states that "respect human 
rights (which encompass democratic freedoms)" (p. 25). Article 2(4)'s 
prohibition on the use of force, therefore, must be read both narrowly 
and in concert with human rights provisions. It is not qualified by, 
they argue, but rather is "complementary to Article 51 (which affirms 
the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense) ... " (p. 25; 
6. P. 21. Kirkpatrick also has argued this point emphatically elsewhere: 
A government which takes power by force, and retains power by force, has no legitimate 
grounds for complaint against those who would wreak [sic] power from it by force. 
And a government whose power depends on external support has no legitimate grounds 
for complaining that externally supported force is used against it. 
Obviously it is legitimate for the U.S. to support an insurgency against a dictatorial govern-
ment that depends on external support 
J. KIRKPATRICK, The Reagan Doctrine ll in 1 LEGmMACY AND FORCE, supra note 3, at 432, 
437 (1988). 
7. P. 33. Kirkpatrick and Gerson unfortunately do not offer a specific citation from which 
they derive this questionable conclusion. In the same paragraph they cite Kant's essay Eternal 
Peace for his belief that "[t]he civil constitution in each state should be republican." P. 33. 
Kant, Eternal Peace, reprinted in c. FRIEDRICH, INEVITABLE PEACE 241, 250 (1948). But in 
that work, Kant also describes as a prerequisite to peace the rule that "[n]o state shall interfere 
by force in the constitution and government of another state." Id. at 248. He sees an exception, 
but only when a state "because of internal dissension should be split into two parts, each of 
which, while constituting a separate state, should lay claim to the whole." Intervention would 
then be justified, because "that state would then be in a condition of anarchy." Id. Barring such 
anarchy, however, "the interference of outside powers would be a trespass on the rights of an 
independent people struggling only with its own inner weakness." Id. 
This passage does less to support Kirkpatrick and Gerson than it does merely to suggest that 
in 1795 Kant understood "interference" as something very different from the "intervention" his 
1989 interpreters write about. Nicaragua in the early 1980s, for example, arguably was not "split 
into two parts" and "in a condition of anarchy." Kant, therefore, might have opposed U.S. 
interference. On the other hand, neither did Nicaragua's internal dissension, if fomented by 
interfering Marxists, constitute "an independent people struggling only with its own inner weak-
ness." Id. (emphasis added). Whether Kant therefore would have seen no "trespass" in U.S. 
funding of the Contras is unclear. 
8. P. 19. This quotation comes from J.S. MILL, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in 21 
CoLLECTED WORKS 111, 123 (1984). 
1966 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1963 
emphasis added). Through this reasoning, they derive the legality of 
military support for "freedom fighters." 
This partisan reading of the U.N. Charter is the demon that Pro-
fessor Henkin attempts to exorcise in his article, "Use of Force: Law 
and U.S. Policy." He agrees with Kirkpatrick and Gerson that the 
Charter unequivocally supports democracy and human rights over to-
talitarianism. But to endorse these ends, he adds, is not to endorse all 
means to achieve them: "With respect to the use of force, the Charter 
is neutral between democracy and totalitarianism" (pp. 62-63; empha-
sis added). For the Charter's drafters, Henkin writes, "Peace was the 
paramount value" (pp. 38-39). It was "more important than progress 
and more important than justice," because its opposite, war, "inflicted 
the greatest injustice, the most serious violations of human rights, and 
the most violence to self-determination and to economic and social 
development" (pp. 38-39). Under the Charter, therefore, pursuit of 
justice alone can never justify military intervention; freedom takes a 
back seat to peace. Thus arguments like those of Kirkpatrick and 
Gerson, Henkin writes, may be morally appealing, but are legally 
irrelevant. 
The Reagan Doctrine, Henkin argues, stands the Charter on its 
head. It simply "asserts the right to use force to impose or restore 
democracy where communism threatens" (p. 68 n.29). Yet the only 
internationally accepted use of force is "humanitarian intervention" 
- basically, a state freeing its own citizens held hostage. Even then, 
such intervention is "strictly limited to what is necessary to save lives" 
(p. 41), a limitation that, for example, the United States ignored by 
invading and occupying Grenada. Thus the Reagan Doctrine, as Hen-
kin portrays it, is the mirror image of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which 
the Soviet Union used to justify invasions of its neighbors. "As a mat-
ter of law, one cannot justify the U.S. action in Grenada or support for 
the contras and condemn the Soviet Union's [1968] role in Czechoslo-
vakia" (p. 56; emphasis added). 
Right v. Might's third essay, Professor Hoffmann's "Ethics and 
Rules of the Game Between the Superpowers," purposefully omits ar-
guments over legality. "[I]nquiry into the ethical aspects of the rules 
of the game between the superpowers," Hoffmann explains, "will re-
veal even more [than legal inquiry] about where the Reagan Doctrine 
is leading American foreign policy and whether that direction is the 
preferable one" (p. 71). Hoffmann's inquiry, however, is a rather 
muted summary of views presented in his earlier works,9 and a weak 
flame to follow the sparks that flew between the preceding essays. 
9. See s. HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OP 
ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL PoLmcs (1981); s. HOFFMANN, JANUS AND MINERVA (1987); Hoff-
mann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OP INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 21 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann, eds. 1971). 
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Hoffman's ethical conclusion can be simply summarized: (1) The 
superpowers' rules governing relations with each other are basically 
good. These rules have largely prevented major crises and have al-
lowed resumption of arms-control attempts. (2) The superpowers' 
rules governing their relationships with other countries are predomi-
nantly bad. These rules leave the Third World impoverished and al-
low belligerent states freedom to pursue their own interests militarily 
or through terrorism. 
Using this framework, Hoffmann condemns the Reagan Doctrine. 
It is "nothing but a new, warmed-over version of the old roll-back 
doctrine" of fighting to topple communist governments and install 
pro-American successors (p. 90). By viewing the whole world, minus 
the established Soviet bloc, as an American sphere of influence, he 
writes, it weakens what is good and strengthens what is bad in the 
existing superpower balance. First, it threatens to upset that balance, 
which thus far has prevented World War III. Second, and more im-
portant, it "impose[s] extremely heavy costs on the innocent popula-
tions that would be the victims of the ... insurrectionary movements 
we support[ ]" (p. 90). In short, its "likely effects are neither order nor 
peace nor democracy" (p. 90). The more ethical solution, Hoffmann 
rather vaguely concludes, is "to put bargaining ahead of unilateral ac-
tion" and cooperate with the Soviet Union to strengthen mutual re-
straints on the use of force (p. 92). 
The final essay in Right v. Might also looks beyond existing law. In 
"The Principles of Force, the Force of Principles," William Rogers 
warns of a growing, irreconcilable ambivalence in interpretations of 
the U.N. Charter. Its prohibition on force is "a principle ... firmly 
based on sovereign separateness," yet its simultaneous championing of 
human rights has thrust it into an area which today is "no longer ex-
clusively domestic ... " (p. 102). The result is fundamental confusion: 
"We are more puzzled now than ever about the contours of the princi-
ple [of self-defense]."10 
10. P. 101. Such puzzlement is not new, however, nor is it confined to the problem of self-
defense. Over twenty-five years ago, Richard Falk observed that 
[a]mong the most serious deficiencies in international law is the frequent absence of an as-
sured procedure for the identification of a violation. . . . This inability to identify violations 
is especially prominent when the action is performed by a leading international actor who is 
able to block censure resolutions in the political organs of the United Nations. 
R. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law - Gaps in Legal Think-
ing, 50 VA. L. R.Ev. 231, 249-50 (1964). 
Other commentators, too, have noted this particular source of confusion and its seriousness. 
Jost Delbriick warns that "[a]lthough increasing international concern for human rights is wel-
come, justification of the international use of force in the cause of human rights may well lead to 
a complete breakdown of the prohibition of the use of force .... " Delbriick, Collective Security, 
in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 104, 112 (1982). And Myres McDougal 
adds that "[t]he number one problem of humankind remains ... establishing a minimum order, 
in control of unauthorized coercion and violence, which will permit more effective pursuit of an 
optimum order." McDougal, International Law and the Future, 50 Miss. L.J. 259, 311 (1979) 
(emphasis added). 
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Non-Charter law, therefore, must plug the gaps. Like Hoffmann, 
Rogers sees hope in superpower cooperation. His proposal, too, is 
more precise. He suggests bilateral rules, "fact-specific and limited in 
time and space" (p. 106), negotiated between the United States and the 
Soviet Union to regulate pressing conflicts. The best example to date 
is the agreement that ended the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Such spe-
cific rules offer the most promise because, first, "[t]he actual conduct 
of foreign relations . . . is more fact-specific than principle-oriented" 
(p. 105). Second, such rules can cure the generality and ambiguity of 
the Charter. Rogers acknowledges both the current rarity of such spe-
cific agreements and the difficulty of creating them. Nonetheless, he 
believes, doing so in the 1990s may be "[t]he real work of providing a 
law to restrain the use of force . . . " (p. 107). 
The proposals of Rogers and Hoffmann are commendable, but un-
satisfying. Both writers leave unanswered the very question that Kirk-
patrick and Gerson forcefully raised: what should the United States 
do when the Soviet Union will not cooperate, or - even more perplex-
ing - when it must deal with a country that does not take orders from 
Moscow? The Cold War - currently melting - is not the only con-
flict that challenges America to use for~e, and superpower policing 
cannot be the only answer. 
Right v. Might does not offer original theories on the proper role of 
force in international relations. But it does present succinct perspec-
tives, fleshed out by a helpful list of suggested readings (pp. 111-18), 
on an enduring political and legal clash. These perspectives help ana-
lyze both the recent U.S. invasion of Panama and the Soviet refusal to 
intervene in Romania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In addition, 
by illustrating the necessity of defining international law broadly and 
of examining its political and ethical character, Right v. Might's au-
thors offer even in their disagreements a useful, albeit paradoxical, af-
firmation of its existence. 
What is most intriguing about Right v. Might, however, is the con-
spicuous shadow that falls across it - the shadow of Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Rogers quotes him (p. 103), Hoffmann pleads for 
imaginative responses to his innovations (p. 91), and Kirkpatrick and 
Gerson assert an already disproved belief that the Soviet Union will 
not allow one-party rule to end in Eastern Europe (p. 29). Only Hen-
kin leaves Gorbachev alone, focusing dutifully on the law. For the 
moment, however, politicians and diplomats - more so than laws -
appear to be driving superpower relations. Gorbachev's twists, and 
President Bush's turns in response, may make the Kirkpatrick-Gerson 
defense of intervention less compelling, Henkin's legal analysis too 
narrow, and the indistinct but hopeful proposals of Hoffmann and 
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· Rogers more realistic. They also may inspire a new round of the 
"great American debate." Right v. Might may require a sequel soon. 
- Craig T. Smith 

